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Lipsitch and Inglesby recently estimated the potential publichealth risks associated with research on influenza virus trans-
mission via respiratory droplets or aerosols between ferrets, lead-
ing them to conclude that such research is too risky to be con-
ducted (1). The authors of that and other publications (2–4)
estimated the probability of laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs)
and onward transmission of the viruses under investigation, as
well as the potential consequence to public health if such events
were to occur. Given the weight assigned to these risk estimates, it
is important that potential pitfalls in the underlying assumptions
in these analyses be rigorously scrutinized. Importantly, the pub-
lished estimateswere based onhistorical data and did not take into
account the numerous risk reductionmeasures that are in place in
the laboratories where the research is conducted. Here, I provide a
critical appraisal of the published work, discussing, challenging,
and modifying the estimates based on the specific conditions un-
der which the work is performed and the properties of the viruses
under investigation. By doing so, the outcome of the risk assess-
ment changes from serious risks to negligible risks for humans and
the environment. As a consequence, a more balanced debate
about the research on influenza virus transmission via respiratory
droplets or aerosols between ferrets is warranted, in particular
given the substantial public health benefits assigned to this type of
research (5, 6).
PROBABILITY OF LABORATORY-ACQUIRED INFECTIONS
Initial calculations of the potential risks associated with research
on influenza virus transmission via respiratory droplets or aero-
sols between ferrets (1–4) used reports on select agent theft, loss,
and release collected by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) from 2004 to 2010 (7) to calculate the proba-
bility of occurrence of LAIs. Although these reports have limita-
tions (1, 4, 7), they provide the most recent account of LAIs in the
United States and probably reflect the current state of the art in
biosafety and biosecurity practices better than older studies on
laboratory incidents (8, 9), e.g., as a consequence of the imple-
mentation of the U.S. select agent program and best practices
developed in biosafety and biosecurity in general over the last
decades. From 2004 to 2010, 11 LAIs in total were reported to the
U.S. CDC, 4 of which occurred in biosafety level 3 (BSL3) facili-
ties. During this 7-year period, on average 10,000 individuals per
year had access to select agents in an average of 292 laboratories
per year, thus totaling 2,044 laboratory-years and 70,000 person-
years of follow-up (7). From these data, the probability of occur-
rence of LAIs under BSL3 conditions was calculated as 4/2,044 (or
2  103) per laboratory-year, or 4/70,000 (or 5.7  105) per
person-year (1–4). These estimates, however, do not take into
account specific pathogen types or research settings. This is cru-
cial, because working practices in, e.g., virology andmicrobiology
laboratories are different and because each biosafety laboratory is
unique (10, 11). Research facilities and the experiments that are
conducted are therefore appraised through targeted risk assess-
ments, in which the planned studies are scrutinized before any
experiment is started. On this note, it is important that none of the
LAIs reported to theU.S. CDC from 2004 to 2010 involved viruses
(7), and the risks of LAIs associated with work on viral pathogens
should thus be estimated as less than 1 per 2,044 (5 104 per
laboratory-year), or less than 1 per 70,000 (1.4  105 per
person-year). Unfortunately, the report by Henkel et al. (7) does
not specify how many of the 2,044 laboratory-years and 70,000
person-years were related to BSL3 facilities versus BSL2 and BSL4
facilities. Thus, using 2,044 and 70,000 as the denominators yields
an underestimation of the true probability of LAIs under BSL3
conditions, as discussed previously (1, 4).
SOME KEY BIOSAFETY MEASURES AND RISK MITIGATION
STRATEGIES AT ERASMUS MC
Research on influenza virus transmission via respiratory droplets
or aerosols between ferrets is performed in facilities and under
conditions that are specifically designed for the purpose of such
studies (12–16). In ordinary BSL3 laboratories, including diag-
nostic laboratories, work is performed in open-front class 2 bio-
safety cabinets with directional airflow, aimed at protecting the
environment from release of pathogens and protecting laboratory
workers from exposure. Contrary to ordinary BSL3 conditions for
work with viruses, all in vivo and in vitro experimental work on
influenza virus transmission in the Erasmus MC facility is carried
out in class 3 isolators or class 3 biosafety cabinets, which are
airtight boxes with negative pressure (200 Pa), to ensure in-
ward flow in case of leakage (12, 16). Handling is done through
airtight gloves fitted to the front of these cabinets. Air released
from the class 3 units is filtered by high efficiency particulate air
(HEPA) filters and then leaves directly via the facility ventilation
system, again via HEPA filters. Only authorized and experienced
personnel that have received extensive training can access the fa-
cility. For animal handling, personnel always work in pairs to re-
duce the chance of human error. Although the laboratory is con-
sidered “clean” because all experiments are conducted in closed
class 3 cabinets and isolators, special personal protective equip-
ment, including laboratory suits, gloves, and FFP3 (class 3 filtering
face piece) facemasks, are used, and all personnel are vaccinated
with the homologous A/H5N1 vaccine. All equipment in the fa-
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cilities is monitored electronically, and alarm systems are em-
ployed to ensure that workers do not enter the facilities if equip-
ment is malfunctioning. All personnel have been instructed and
trained how to act in case of incidents, which are handled upon
consultation between a senior staff member, a clinical microbiol-
ogist, the institutional biosafety officers, and the facility manage-
ment. Antiviral drugs (oseltamivir or zanamivir) are used imme-
diately in the event that an incident should occur. Every incident
in the laboratory is followed up by actions to prevent such inci-
dents from happening again. The facilities, personnel, and proce-
dures are inspected by the U.S. CDC every 3 years, in agreement
with the U.S. select agent regulations for overseas laboratories and
by the Dutch government (Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport
[ILT] inspection) (12, 16).
The biosafety conditions in the Erasmus MC facility thus ex-
tend well beyond “normal” BSL3 conditions for working with
viruses, and a number of these biosafety measures should be con-
sidered when the probability of LAIs is inferred from the U.S.
CDC report. Unfortunately, an exact number for the effectiveness
of individual biosafetymeasures is not available (9). However, it is
reasonable to assume that the effectiveness of the physical separa-
tion of personnel from the viruses they work with through the use
of class 3 isolator units and class 3 biosafety cabinets, the use of
personnel protective equipment, the extensive training program,
the use of experienced personnel only, and the application of a
two-person rule to reduce human error during animal experi-
ments would yield a decrease in the probability of LAIs. Although
themagnitude of this increase in safety is not known, I assume that
it is at least a factor of 10. Using the risk analysis done by others
and this assumption of reduced risk, the probability of a LAI in the
Erasmus MC facility would be reduced to below 0.1  (1.4 
105), or1.4 106 per person-year. The quantitative risk as-
sessment to be performed upon request of the U.S. government
(17) will have the challenging task of a better quantitative assess-
ment of the effectiveness for each of the biosafety measures in
individual laboratories, to yield exact numbers instead of the con-
servative estimates used here.
The vaccination of laboratory personnel against the homolo-
gous A/H5N1 virus under investigation produces another layer of
safety that results in further risk mitigation. Given the generally
accepted efficacy of influenza vaccine of ~65% for laboratory-
confirmed influenza in healthy adults (18), vaccination reduces
the probability of an LAI that results in viral escape to below 0.35
 (1.4 106), or5 107 per person-year. The 65% value is
almost certainly an underestimate, because this number is taken
from general population studies that include individuals with im-
paired immunity and nonexact matches between the vaccine an-
tigen and the circulating viruses. It is important to note that the
antibody titers in our vaccinated laboratory workers are high
(geometric mean titer, 987; range, 160 to 10,240) compared to the
titers generally accepted as protective against seasonal influenza
(40) (19) and that individuals are revaccinated if andwhen their
antibody titers decrease (12).
As a consequence of the monitoring of equipment both elec-
tronically and by visual inspection, potential exposures to virus
are unlikely to go unnoticed. Upon any potential exposures, per-
sonnel receive oseltamivir treatment upon consultation with var-
ious specialists as indicated above. Such early treatment with
drugs has been reported to have ~80% efficacy against human
influenza virus infection (20) and avian influenza virus infection
(21). Here, it is important to note that viruses under study in the
ErasmusMC facility are evaluated for their sensitivity to oseltami-
vir (12). The immediate treatment of laboratory personnel with
oseltamivir upon any potential exposure to virus is thus expected
to reduce the probability of LAI further, to below 0.2  (5 
107), or 1 10  7 per person-year, given the average 80%
efficacy in preventing laboratory-confirmed influenza.
From this analysis, the conservative estimate is that when re-
search is performed on transmission of influenza viruses via respi-
ratory droplets or aerosols between ferrets in the Erasmus MC
facility, to which 10 persons have access, 1 LAI would be expected
to occur less frequently than once every 1 million years.
PROBABILITY OF ONWARD TRANSMISSION FROM A CASE
OF LAI
The second factor in the equation of the previous risk assessments
is the probability of onward transmission from each case of LAI.
Previous studies used 5 to 60% as the probability of onward trans-
mission (1, 2), which is based on the unlimited spread of a pan-
demic influenza virus in the general population. It is important to
note that onward transmission from LAIs has so far been uncom-
mon (7–9). In the case of research on influenza virus transmission
via respiratory droplets or aerosols between ferrets, a substantial,
scientifically justified reduction from the probability of 0.05 to 0.6
of onward transmission from an LAI can be made, based on the
above-mentioned biosafety measures and risk mitigation strate-
gies that are in place (12).
The first factor that needs to be considered is that laboratory
personnel that acquired the LAI were vaccinated against the ho-
mologous A/H5N1 virus and treated with oseltamivir upon any
incident with potential exposure to the virus. Although the vacci-
nation and treatment may have been insufficient to prevent infec-
tion altogether (hence the occurrence of the LAI at a frequency of
less than once every 1 million years), the virus shedding in H5-
vaccinated and oseltamivir-treated individuals is likely to be re-
duced substantially, compared to the onward transmission in
times of spread during an influenza pandemic from untreated
immunologically naive individuals. If we assume a conservative
2-log reduction in virus excretion in immunized and treated indi-
viduals (20–24) compared to untreated immunologically naive
individuals, the range of probability of onward transmission from
a case of LAI would be reduced to5 104 to 6 103.
As an important risk mitigation strategy to reduce onward
transmission upon any potential LAI, ErasmusMCpolicy dictates
enforcement of quarantine of any laboratory personnel that are
potentially virus exposed. This policy would reduce the exposure
of nonlaboratory personnel to one (the partner of the laboratory
worker) or nil, rather than the ~100 contacts human adults would
ordinarily have during a 5-day time frame (25). As a consequence,
the transmission probability can be further reduced ~100-fold,
yielding a probability of onward transmission from the case of LAI
of5 106 to 6 105.
A final factor to consider in the calculation of the probability of
onward transmission from each case of LAI is the basic reproduc-
tion number (R0) of the influenza virus under investigation. As
indicated above, the previous risk assessmentswere based onR0of
pandemic influenza virus. However, laboratory experiments have
shown that the efficiency of transmission of the laboratory-
derived influenza viruses was lower than that of the transmission
of pandemic and seasonal influenza viruses in ferrets, as could be
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expected (12, 16, 26). Moreover, given that the viruses are ferret
adapted rather than human adapted, even an extremely conserva-
tive adjustment of the transmissibility parameter by a factor of 2
would yield a “final” estimation of the probability of onward
transmission from a case of LAI of2.5 106 to 3 105.
PROBABILITY OF AN LAI FOLLOWED BY ONWARD
TRANSMISSION
Multiplying the probability of occurrence of an LAI by the prob-
ability of onward transmission from each case of LAI, one can
estimate that the probability of an LAI resulting in onward trans-
mission would range between (1 107) (2.5 106) (or 2.5
 1013) and (1 107) (3 105) (or 3 1012). From this
analysis, the estimate is that when research is performed on trans-
mission of influenza viruses via respiratory droplets or aerosols
between ferrets in the Erasmus MC facility, to which 10 persons
have access, 1 LAIwith onward transmissionwould be expected to
occur far less frequently than once every 33 billion years. This
probability could be assigned the term “negligible,” given that the
age of our planet is only 5 billion years.
THE CONSEQUENCE OF AN LAI FOLLOWED BY ONWARD
TRANSMISSION
In previous work (1–4), it was assumed that if a ferret-adapted
avian influenza virus caused an LAI and onward transmission, it
could cause a pandemic with an attack rate of 24 to 38%, as de-
duced from previous pandemics, and a case fatality rate ranging
from 1 to 60% in a population of 7 billion people, thus leading to
millions of, or more than a billion, fatalities. However, I consider
an attack rate and case fatality rate of this magnitude to be unre-
alistic. Given that the avian influenza viruses under investigation
are ferret adapted rather than human adapted, it is unlikely that
these viruseswould spread as efficiently between humans.Of note,
this does not mean that the ferret model is therefore useless for
studies to increase our fundamental knowledge about airborne
virus transmission; it simply means that—just like when the
mouse model is used to address fundamentals in immunolo-
gy—we need to carefully validate any results obtained in animals
before extrapolation to humans. Throughout the history of virol-
ogy, scientists have adapted viruses to cells, chicken embryos, or
animal species in order to yield viruses that have increased repli-
cation properties in these specific hosts or cells but at the same
time lose replication capacity and virulence in others (27). Exam-
ples are the passaging of vaccinia virus in chicken embryo fibro-
blasts to yield modified vaccinia virus Ankara (MVA), which is
now in use as a safe vaccine vector (28), the passaging of measles
virus, mumps virus, and rubella virus in various cells to yield the
live-attenuatedMMR vaccine (29), and the passaging of influenza
viruses in mice, ferrets, and eggs to yield the vaccine strain A/PR/
8/34 (30), all of which are highly attenuated in humans.
The higher bound of the range of case fatality rates of 60%
stems from the number of deaths recorded among laboratory-
confirmed cases of A/H5N1 influenza reported to theWHO (31).
Since mild cases of infection—those individuals that do not con-
sult a physician or remain untested—are not recorded, the true
case fatality rate of A/H5N1 virus infections in humans is un-
known. Due to intrinsic difficulties associated with serology data
to estimate the numbers of previously infected individuals, there is
no consensus on the incidence of A/H5N1 infections in Southeast
Asia (32, 33), but case fatality rates orders ofmagnitude lower than
60% have been inferred (27). In addition, it is important to note
that fatalities in ferrets infected with A/H5N1 virus via respiratory
droplets or aerosols have not occurred, contrary to when ferrets
received large dosages of A/H5N1 virus directly in the (lower)
airways (12, 13, 16).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
On the topic of intentional or accidental releases of viruses from
laboratories involved in influenza virus transmission studies, it is
important to note that during a decade of transmission studies on
pandemic and epidemic strains derived from the 1918, 1957, 1968,
and 2009 pandemics and on various wild-type and laboratory-
adapted zoonotic viruses of subtypes H1, H2, H5, H7, and H9
(summarized in reference 16), no LAIs have been recorded. There
have also been no recorded intentional or accidental releases dur-
ing more than a century of research with human and animal in-
fluenza viruses, including highly pathogenic avian influenza vi-
ruses, even at times when biocontainment measures were largely
nonexistent. Some have argued that the 1977 Russian influenza
epidemic was the result of a laboratory accident (2), but in 1977,
influenza research was done under conditions of limited biocon-
tainment, and attenuated and wild type strains were tested in hu-
mans. We do not know what happened in 1977, but we cannot
conclude that the virus escaped a BSL3() laboratory.
Since natural influenza pandemics have occurred on average
every 30 years over the last century, the probability that the next
pandemic will emerge in nature is orders ofmagnitude larger than
emergence from a laboratory. Given the recently summarized im-
mediate and short-term benefits of research on influenza viruses
that are transmitted via respiratory droplets or aerosols between
ferrets (5, 6) and the longer-term aims to fully understand and
predict and prevent pandemics, combined with the extremely low
risk to humans and the environment associated with properly
conducted experiments, I conclude that it is sensible and accept-
able to restart the research, provided that any laboratory partici-
pating in this research adopt biosafety and biosecurity conditions
comparable to those that are currently in place (12–16).
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